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pacity to perform, and represents the knowledge base that is critical for obtaining and managing results. The challenges of the 21st century-the threat of terrorism, an economic crisis coupled with an aging and increasingly diverse population, growing health and income inequalities, and rising healthcare costs-reinforce the vital importance of a talented and dedicated federal workforce at all levels to navigate, regulate, and manage the complex concerns confronting the dynamic, knowledge-driven, global economy. Yet, the looming retirements of substantial numbers of experienced leaders in the US government, together with difficulties in attracting or retaining new talent, has led to skill shortages throughout the government. Recent reports from the General Accountability Office (GAO) explicitly identify strategic human capital management as a government-wide high-risk area. 2, 3 Decades of downsizing government and obsolescent civil service hiring practices resulting in the lack of sustainable succession plans at the majority of agencies have long warranted major reform in human capital management and planning. 4, 5 A 2002 GAO report reiterates the importance of an effective strategic human capital management plan serving as the cornerstone of initiatives to transform federal agencies to be flatter, results oriented, and externally focused; agency leaders can use their human resource effectively in daily decision making and program planning. 6 A strategic approach to human capital management requires that human resource policies and practices be linked with the strategic objectives of the agency. 7 In response to the directives articulated in the President's Management Agenda, the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) drafted the 2008 Strategic Human Capital Management Plan (SHCMP) 8 to ensure that CDC's actions are aligned to support its mission and goals. CDC, one of the 11 major operating divisions of the US Department of Health and Human Services (HHS), is considered the premier agency responsible for health promotion, disease and injury prevention, and emergency preparedness, both domestically and globally. The agency is recognized for conducting the highest-quality research and employing the best-available evidence base to guide and shape public health programs, policy, and practice. SHCMP emphasizes the importance of adopting a scientific, evidence-based approach to human capital management.
In this article, we draw some lessons from the personnel economics literature to help CDC enhance human capital planning and policies to promote the culture of high-performance government. Personnel economics, a subfield within labor economics, drills deeply inside a firm to study human resource management practices, policies, and methods. [9] [10] [11] This includes economic topics such as compensation, employee turnover, hiring practices, and incentives, as well as other topics that do not appear to be inherently economic concerns (eg, training, teamwork, worker empowerment, and peer relationships) within hierarchical organizations. 12 The theoretical underpinnings for the field primarily developed during the late 1970s and 1980s, but starting from the mid-1990s, the wider availability of personnel records from large organizations led to a surge in empirical research in the field.
Our objective is to explore topics in the personnel economics literature that are of practical importance and empirical relevance to CDC's internal workforce and personnel needs. In doing so, we draw heavily on the economics literature on the internal organization of the government, including empirical studies on specific government organizations. We focus on identifying research questions and methodological approaches that hold promise in shaping or exploring SHCMP concerns at the agency. From an academic perspective, these insights might be meaningful in terms of exploring the relevance of personnel economics theories by using agency-specific personnel data, as well as allowing comparisons with similar analyses conducted on other agencies or sectors. This article complements two other articles contained in this conference volume, 11, 13 either by adding a CDC context to personnel issues and research reviewed in the other articles or by examining theory and evidence on relevant human resource topics not included in the companion articles.
However, it must be clarified that this review article does not claim or attempt to provide an exhaustive coverage of all critical human resource management topics; instead, the purpose is to integrate the personnel economics perspective by focusing on selected key topics (ie, incentive design, recruitment, and retention) that have been theoretically or empirically applied to the government sector and are also relevant and applicable to the CDC. The rest of the article is organized as follows: Section (CDC's Workforce: A Brief Overview) provides a brief overview of the CDC civilian workforce; the forthcoming sections ("Public-Private Differentials: Incentives Underlying Sorting of Workers to the Public Health Sector" to "The Effectiveness of Workforce Incentives in Shaping Retention and Retirement") review the personnel economics literature to provide relevant insights on such topics as public-private earning differentials, the design of pay and performance incentives in the government, and effective workforce tools for shaping retention and retirement outcomes. Section (Conclusion: Potential Applications to CDC's Workforce) concludes by providing promising empirical questions that can be explored by using the CDC personnel database.
• CDC's Workforce: A Brief Overview
To provide an organizational context for personnel economics topics reviewed in this article, this section provides a brief overview of CDC's workforce. As of October 2005, CDC's federal workforce comprised 8 129 civilian employees in 200 job categories, 854 US Public Health Service Commissioned Corps (CC) officers in 11 job categories, and approximately 1 400 locally employed staff stationed overseas and paid by the US Department of State. 8 In addition, contractors form an important and growing component of the CDC workforce (increasing from approximately 1 800 to 4 300 during [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . 8 The size of the overall workforce has increased with time, with the share of CC officers remaining at a stable 10 percent to 11 percent during 1995 to 2005 (Figure 1 ). We provide additional descriptive statistics on the federal civilian workers (also the focus of CDC's SHCMP), who are the dominant component of the agency workforce; have a uniform system of compensation, retirement, and other benefits; and are included in the HHS personnel and payroll system.ahttp://www.bls.gov/emp/emplab1.htm) of the US civilian workforce. Consequently, the proportion of CDC's workforce that is closer to retirement has also been increasing. For example, the proportion of CDC civilian employees who have met the government requirement for age and years of experience and are eligible to retire within the next 5 years has increased from 19 percent to 24 percent during 1995 to 2005, with the average age of these cohorts increasing from 49 years to 51 years.
The average age of the CDC civilian workforce is increasing at all stages of government experience and demonstrates an increase in the proportion of early career employees (ie, those with less than 10 years of service) and a decline in the proportion of midcareer and senior employees (ie, those with 10 years or more of experience) (Figure 2 ). In addition, the proportion of relatively new hires, indicated by the proportion of the workforce with less than 5 years of government service, increased from 20 percent to 27 percent during 1995 to 2005, with their average age increasing from 36 years to 41 years.Changes were also noted in the demographic composition of CDC's workforce during 1995 to 2005 ( Table 1 ). The proportion of women increased slightly from 58 percent to 59 percent, whereas the proportion of Whites declined from 72 percent to 65 percent, indicating an increase in the proportion of minority racial/ethnic groups including Blacks, Hispanics, American Indians and Alaskan Natives, and Asian and Pacific Islanders during 1995 to 2005. The civilian workforce at CDC is also becoming more educated, with the proportion with advanced degrees (ie, master's or doctorate degrees) increasing from 33 percent to 48 percent during 1995 to 2005.
Improvements were noted in the career profile of women, Blacks, and Asian and Pacific Islanders. For example, the proportion of women in the higher General Schedule (GS/GM) grades 14 or 15 increased from 30 percent to 46 percent during 1995 to 2005 (Table 2) . Likewise, the proportion of Blacks and Asian and Pacific Islanders in GS/GM grades 14 or 15 increased from 7 percent to 12 percent and from 3 percent to 6 percent, respectively, during this same period. Also, the proportion of civilian employees in professional categories increased substantially from 36 percent to 49 percent, whereas the proportion in administrative categories declined slightly from 39 percent to 37 percent. These changes in occupational composition were accompanied by an increase (from 61% to 65%) in the proportion of employees in professional categories in the higher GS/GM grades 14 or 15 but a decrease (from 38% to 32%) in the proportion of employees in administrative categories in similar GS/GM grades levels.
•
Public-Private Differentials: Incentives Underlying Sorting of Workers to the Public Health Sector
The public service mission and motivation often underlying federal government jobs might dwarf the purpose of certain private-sector jobs, yet the federal government has often been inefficient in branding itself. Decades of downsizing, where the governmentworkforce was "viewed as costs to be cut and not as assets to be valued," have left the federal government with little experience in recruiting new talent. 2 Also, a widespread public perception exists that the government does not pay as well as the private sector does, leading to difficulties in recruiting the best and brightest talents. An active body of economic research that explores whether public-sector workers actually receive equal pay for equal work, as compared with their private-sector counterparts, indicates that wage structure in the private and public sectors evolved in different ways during the past 4 decades.
14,15 As a broad class, government jobs pay well, and furthermore, beginning in the 1970s, average wages of a typical worker in the federal government increased relative to the private sector. However, this was accompanied by wage inequality (between those at the top and the bottom of the wage distribution) increasing at a much faster rate in the private sector than in the public sector. Although certain positive premiums are associated with being employed in the public sector, the relative wage compression in public-sector salaries at higher levels can affect labor supply behavior by altering the sorting of workers between the sectors. 14 Given that high-performing employees are more likely to be successful regardless of their sector of employment, high-skilled, high-performing public-sector workers would thus have increased financial incentives to leave the public sector and enter private-sector jobs. Recent evidence indicates that lower-level employees in the public sector have higher salaries than those with similar qualifications in the private sector, and senior employees in the public sector have lower pay than their private sector counterparts. 16, 17 Thus, the shape of the wage distribution between the two sectors plays a critical role in determining the public sector's ability to attract and retain a high-quality workforce. Consequently, future policy discussion on optimal compensation packages at CDC should pay close attention to the relative dispersion in incentives and opportunities, including possible reform to allow the agency flexibility in adjusting pay schedules to recruit and retain the talent it needs.
• Incentive Design in the Government:
Motivating the Public Workforce
The government personnel and compensation systems have been alleged to be antiquated, slow, and rigid, imposing costs in terms of attracting, retaining, and motivating talented personnel. 18 This belief motivated an ongoing government-wide initiative for promoting a high-performance culture by developing a compensation system that provides incentives to motivate high performance, reward strong performers, and induce the self-selection of talented workers.
Economic theories on incentive design that analyze how workers and managers respond to different incentives are motivated primarily by, and applied to, private-sector organizations. Certain theories have been used to analyze incentive design in the public sector, [19] [20] [21] by treating government agencies like large, complex private firms but with key differences. For example, the primary goal of a private firm might be profit maximization, whereas government agencies pursue multiple goals to promote social welfare. In this section, we draw on the economics literature regarding the internal organization of the government, [20] [21] [22] with specific focus on drawing inferences that are relevant to CDC. The incentives that exist for civilian federal government employees at CDC, who comprise more than 90 percent of the workforce (excluding contractors and locally employed staff at overseas stations), include both monetary as well as nonmonetary incentives (eg, professional development classes offered by CDC University and various employee recognition programs). Also, despite recent emphasis on high-powered incentives (eg, bonuses and cash awards), lower-powered incentives (eg, seniority-based pay or grade increases that provide agents only a limited fraction of his or her marginal product) are important and tend to prevail in the government sector. We explain in the following the strengths and limitations of the different incentive mechanisms at CDC.
Performance-based incentives
Initiatives to reform government bureaucracies stem from the belief that government agencies perform inadequately because workers lack high-powered, performance-based incentives. The economics literature reveals that pay for performance makes sense only if the gains in organizational productivity induced by performance pay outweigh the costs of performance measurement. 19 The owners of private firms pursue a well-defined goal of maximizing profit with metrics (eg, earnings or stock prices) considered as reflecting firm performance and often incorporated in building managerial incentives. Such settings with a single measurable output are easiest and best for incorporating and tying in with performance-based incentives. However, the mission and goals of CDC, as with outputs of most government agencies (unlike private firms), is multidimensional and diverse. The multidimensionality of goals, and consequently performance metrics, pose two related difficulties that often hinder the construction of individual performance incentives in government agencies.
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First, the dimensions of performance (unlike profits or costs) for federal agencies and their workforce are difficult to define and measure. The nature of the work is often complex, service-oriented, and intended to promote social welfare (eg, services for vulnerable populations) with individual effort and performance often motivated by nonmonetary incentives (eg, commitment to social concerns), which are difficult to measure. The rationale for government intervention in provision of a good or service (including public health) stems from the inability or unavailability of market-based incentives in yielding a socially optimal resource allocation. Individual performance might also be difficult to measure because work is usually done by teams, making identifying and rewarding individual performers difficult, possibly resulting in free-rider problems. 19, 20 CDC, as with most agencies, has tried to counteract this problem by using an array of incentive mechanisms, including both team-based and individual incentives, for specific circumstances.
Second, the multiplicity of goals raises the problem of weights assigned to these various goals. A well-defined social welfare function for a government agency with clearly defined weights on all dimensions of performance might be as easy to measure and implement as revenue or profits in the private sector. However, the multiple goals and objectives of government agencies might not always be complementary. 19 For example, the CDC Healthy People 23 objective of achieving optimal life span and true improvements in the quality of people's lives while reducing health disparities among population groups, especially the most vulnerable, might involve an implicit trade-off between equity and efficiency considerations. Thus, even if both objectives were measured and monitored, the question of how to weigh these twin objectives optimally remain. Most importantly, it would be inappropriate to tie individual performance to the achievement of these population-level objectives, especially when achievement of these objectives extends beyond agency-level performance and is dependent on multiple exogenous factors, including efforts of partners, environmental factors, available technologies, other unknown contingencies, and most importantly, the changes in the administration and political climate.
Another important challenge is the measurement of performance. Performance metrics can be objective (quantitative) or subjective (qualitative). Performance evaluation for CDC's federal employees had traditionally relied on subjective performance assessments where the supervisors rated employee performance, usually on a five-tier scale. Inadequate performers do not receive longevity pay (ie, one-step within-grade) increase, whereas high-performers receive an additional incremental (ie, quality-step or twosteps within-grade) increase in pay (source: http:// www.opm.gov/oca/pay/html/wgiqa.asp). Previous studies regarding the GS/GM employees in the US Department of Defense (DOD) indicate that an overwhelming majority of employees receive an acceptable rating, indicating limited variation in employee performance and resulting in virtually everyone receiving a longevity increase. 24 In an effort to improve accountability, CDC, as with other HHS agencies, adopted the Performance Management Appraisal Program system in 2006 that uses a four-tier appraisal system based on a calendar year (vs a fiscal year) and measurable performance metrics explicitly tied to organizational goals. 25 Periodic internal assessments are under way at specific agencies, including CDC, to evaluate the relative impact of the new appraisal system in terms of enhancing incentives for high-performers while also promoting internal consistency and equity in allocation of monetary rewards and recognition.
Promotion-and seniority-based incentives
Lower-powered incentives tend to prevail in the government sector (as previously discussed) for two reasons: (1) the difficulty in measuring the performance of federal workers and (2) the potential trade-off between the measurable and nonmeasurable (social welfare) objectives. Consequently, CDC has alternative approaches for providing incentives for performance, including promotion-and seniority-based incentives for its workforce.
Promotion-based incentives for CDC's civil service employees rely on the published pay tables (http:// www.opm.gov/oca/09tables/index.asp) where an employee's pay depends on both grade and years of service. Increases within a grade, or step increases, occur as employees gain more years of service and are virtually automatic as long as employees are rated in the top two tiers (ie, fully successful or exceptional). However, promotion to higher grades occurs only periodically in recognition of greater skill, experience, responsibility, and performance assessed within a designated period. 26 Promotion typically involves a change in job responsibilities and is contingent on a job opening at the higher level. Promotion-based incentives are an important part of an employee's career path in hierarchical organizations, and it is quite common for CDC's civil service career employees to climb up the promotion ladder over time based on quality performance and increasing responsibilities. In addition, CDC, similar to other federal agencies, hires laterally but internal employees who have subjectmatter expertise and agency-specific experience might be more competitive, especially when considering midcareer and senior-level positions.
Promotion-based systems do not require explicit performance measurement but rather a determination of who might be the best performer. However, this might induce workers to attempt at influencing the outcome of promotion contests by lobbying the supervisor who makes the promotion decision. To ensure that the promotion system provides meaningful performance incentives, an organization should maintain the integrity of the rating and selection process. The US military often relies on national selection boards for midgrade promotions. 20 Likewise, CDC relies on internal and external peer-review committees when evaluating eligibility for promotions using certain mechanisms. However, as employees climb the promotion ladder, the probability of future promotions and accompanying expected financial return declines. 19 In addition, given the compressed pay structure in the government relative to the private sector, the financial incentives associated with performance and promotion decline and widen, as compared with the private sector, at the higher grades, which might have an impact on the government's ability to attract and retain highly talented personnel. 13, 14 Finally, promotion ladders often vary across occupational areas. RAND Corporation studies on the DOD civilian occupations indicate that highly technical workforces might have flat careers, entering at a high-pay grade but advancing slowly and spending the majority of their career within two or three compressed grades. 20, 24 In such situations, government agencies often rely on seniority-based incentives to keep employees motivated. Seniority-based incentives recognize that employees often stay with the same organization for long periods, and employers can thus motivate high performance with rewards later in their career, contingent on existing performance. Senioritybased incentives are particularly suited for careers limited to narrow pay ranges, and pay varies such that employees might be underpaid relative to their productive worth during the initial phase of their career. However, as they become senior, they have opportunities to advance to a higher pay ranges that overpays relative to their worth, but such advancement is contingent on demonstrating high performance during the initial phase. The 2001 RAND study by Asch 24 demonstrates that such horizontal career tracks with periodic, sharp increases in pay are noted among DOD personnel with advanced degrees whose career progression beyond this increase depends on their performance as junior employees.
Tirole 21 indicated that a primary motivation driving government workers is indeed their future career concerns. Consequently, both career civil servants and elected officials are concerned with the effect of their performance not so much on monetary rewards, but rather the impact of their reputation and professional stature on future promotions and career prospects in both the public and private sector. Tirole 21 also enhances Holmstrom's 27 theoretical model on career concerns by incorporating multiple interpretations of performance. Holmstrom described four conditions for career concerns in government to be effective. First, performance should be visible to those making decisions on promotions and salary increases. Second, existing performance should be indicative of the worker's ability for future performance. Third, the workers should be forward-looking and not discount future prospects. Fourth, signaling (ie, relaying selective information on existing performance and future ability to the decision maker) should not be too costly for the worker.
Nonmonetary incentives
The majority of standard economic models focus on material incentives as the primary factor inducing employees to work hard. A substantial body of evidence, however, indicates that workers want more than just monetary compensation; in particular, they value and respond to signs of respect (eg, symbolic awards, recognition, attention, and trust) (see Ellingsen and Johannesson 28 for an extensive review). Appreciation for work performed is the only job reward factor that ranks among the top two motivators for US workers during the past half century. 29 In addition, recent worker surveys indicate that lack of recognition or appreciation is a major factor influencing people to leave organizations, second only to lack of career development opportunities. 30 Thus, employers might choose to pay employees by a combination of monetary rewards and respect, including disseminating the information externally, thereby influencing the respect that employees might receive from others. In addition, public-sector workers are concerned about the public image of their organization and its top leaders. For example, professionals choosing a career at CDC often are willing to forgo higher pay for a comparable job in the private sector, because they derive meaning and motivation from the impact of their work in promoting the public health mission of saving lives and improving health and well-being around the world.
Incorporating the concept of identity in organizations changes the understanding of such policies as incentive pay and supervision, including the critical impact of an employee's sense of identity and attachment on the functioning of enterprises. 31 Theorists who are identity advocates argue that well-functioning organizations should not rely solely on monetary compensation schemes but also invest in creating identities and place workers in jobs with which they identify. Similarly, organizational efficiency might be enhanced when organizations hire workers who share the organizations' mission. 32, 33 For example, the military actively promotes its identity by stressing "service before self" and de-emphasizing pecuniary rewards, which (as per the previously mentioned articles) can substitute for incentive pay. Thus, mission-oriented organizations might want to invest in the identity of their workers by transforming them from outsiders to insiders, who feel an affinity with the organization mission. Analogies can be drawn between the military and CDC's commitment to ensure that its workforce, both civilian employees and the CC officers, identifies with the public health mission of health protection and health promotion that directly impacts people's lives and well-being. An approach that CDC has used in building its core workforce is to invest in different time-limited fellowship programs that recruit professionals in a range of relevant categories-medical epidemiologists, economists, informaticians, public health advisors, and managers-who are then exposed to the organizational culture and mission and trained in applying and adapting their specific skills to public health. 34 A majority of graduates from these feeder programs are offered long-term retention opportunities, and in the process are transformed into insiders who identify with the agency's public health mission. Graduates from these fellowship programs have helped shape the career path to public health at CDC by assuming the rank and file positions in almost every occupational category, with the most driven and talented often holding leadership positions at the agency.
• The Effectiveness of Workforce Incentives in Shaping Retention and Retirement
An empirical approach used in the personnel economics literature assesses whether incentives embedded in human resource systems yield desirable personnel outcomes by examining workforce outcomes, such as recruitment, retention, promotion, and pay of highquality workers. The companion article by Asch et al 13 included in this journal issue summarizes critical workforce management concerns in the federal civil service, highlighting promising empirical approaches to assess effectiveness of workforce tools in shaping retention and retirement outcomes. The article also provides specific examples drawn from research applied to the DOD civilian workforce. The looming retirement crisis that confronts the federal civilian workforce includes the DOD and CDC workforces. In addition, the workforce tools available to managers of federal civilian workforces to manage retention and retirement outcomes are similar at DOD and CDC. To meet the impending retirement crisis, CDC managers should either increase hiring or increase retention. Another possible mechanism might be contracting out noncritical services-an approach that has been increasingly adopted in recent years at CDC as well as other agencies. It might also be important to retain selected retirement-eligible personnel because their institutional knowledge can be critical and difficult to replace within a relatively short time span. Overall, managers will have to use all the workforce tools at their disposal to shape a succession plan that ensures that the skill, experience, and age composition of their workforce can meet future challenges.
A study of careers of DOD civil service personnel during 1988 to 1996 indicated that personnel managers are able to use the system effectively to generate desirable workforce outcomes. 24 The analysis tracks not only pay, promotion, and retention for each employee but also the timing of their promotions and their exit. The study uses three measures of personnel quality: supervisory ratings, education level at entry, and promotion speed. The findings indicate that higher-performing DOD personnel are paid more and promoted faster than lower-performing personnel, controlling for other characteristics (eg, age, sex, years of service, and occupation) irrespective of which measure of quality is used. In addition, the study finds considerable variation in pay and promotion among personnel in different occupations, indicating that managers are able to use the common pay tables to achieve different outcomes by occupation. The analysis also indicates that better-performing personnel have higher probability of retention. An area of concern identified were employees with advanced degrees (ie, master's or doctorate degrees), who were paid more but promoted slower, and were difficult to retain, holding constant all employment factors, including entry grade and occupation. This last finding is particularly pertinent to the CDC workforce because more than 48 percent of its civilian workforce holds an advanced degree (ie, master's or doctorate degrees).
A study of workforce outcomes among scientists and engineers working in DOD laboratories during 1982 to 1996 detected higher financial gains throughout the study period among those with greater skills and responsibilities. 35 Moreover, despite the wage decompression in the private sector, which led to higher pay among high-skilled, high-performing workers, the DOD science and engineering laboratory workforce remained unaffected in terms of quality, including its new hires. Similar findings were noted in earlier studies on DOD workers. 36 Asch et al 13 noted three factors that might explain the favorable civil service workforce outcomes and are equally relevant to the CDC workforce. 13 First, historically, federal pay has been at par with private-sector pay (discussed in Section 2; "CDC's Workforce: A Brief Overview"). Second, high-quality and skilled civil service workers might enter and stay in the government because of the nature of their work and their motivation for public service. Third, strong financial incentives (eg, pension benefits and continued life and health insurance coverage) exist in the federal retirement system for employees to stay in service until retirement eligibility is reached.
Retirement decisions, however, are shaped by multiple factors, including characteristics that are tied to one's job and other factors related to personal wealth, health, and family circumstances. Available personnel data do not contain information on these other critical factors that influence retirement decisions. Nonetheless, personnel data can be useful in examining the effect of feasible workforce-shaping incentives on the timing of retirement. DOD-sponsored RAND research studies have examined the effects of early retirement incentives, buyout incentives, and retention allowances on the retirement behavior of DOD civilian employees 50 years or older participating in the Civil Service Retirement System. 37, 38 Retention and buyout incentives are intended to increase voluntary retirement, whereas the retention allowance is intended to increase the financial incentive to stay in service. Potential impact of these financial incentives on retirement behavior is summarized in the review article by Asch et al. 13 Overall, the results indicate that these workforceshaping policies have a sizeable effect on the financial incentive to retire or stay in service. The evidence gleaned from these studies might have some relevance for CDC, but similar studies using CDC-specific personnel data should be undertaken to examine whether these workforce-shaping incentives might be effective in helping shape the future workforce composition at CDC.
Conclusion: Potential Applications to CDC's Workforce
Personnel economics is a subfield of labor economics that applies economic and mathematical approaches to peer inside a firm and examine human resource management practices, policies, and methods. The field has increased in scope and importance during the last 2 decades, offering theoretically sound and empirically rigorous approaches that can shape an evidence-based approach to human capital planning at such federal agencies as CDC. Examining the internal labor market at federal agencies can also be valuable to academics because empirical evidence examining personnel economics theories by peering inside an organization or firm are limited as a result of the confidentiality of personnel-level data. Consequently, analyses and inferences about salaries, promotions, separation, hierarchies, or other related phenomena at CDC, although not generalizable to other organizations, should be, when possible, compared with findings from workforces at other federal agencies or the private sector. Majority of the workforce issues discussed in this article are also relevant for state and local public health agencies, with the empirical approaches applicable in exploring similar issues using personnel data from these specific agencies.
The personnel economics literature has motivated CDC studies that examine how the agency might be managing careers in terms of entry, exit, and career progression, including variations in career paths by occupational and other categories. Key challenges explored in these studies include (1) examining changes in the hierarchical organization structure through time; (2) examining employee career paths, including the timing of promotions and variation in promotion and exit rates by tenure; and (3) exploring differences in career progression by demographic, occupational, and other clusters. In a recent study, we use CDC personnel data to examine sex-related differences in promotion rates among civilian employees at the agency. 39 The study findings demonstrate a diminishing gender gap in promotion that can be attributed to improvements in educational attainment and work experience among women. However, a substantial gap still exists in promotion that cannot be explained by qualifications and experience, indicating continuing barriers in career advancement for women, which is consistent with the wider labor and personnel economics literature. [40] [41] [42] Other questions are interesting and might be important, including examining the dynamics as well as the stability of employee career paths, identifying factors that induce long-term worker-organization attachments, examining the return on tenure versus the return on performance, and if feasible, extending it to examine whether the experience-performance differential can explain the experience-earning differentials. We hope the framework, ideas, and approaches presented in this article will continue to provoke further discussion and motivate studies that provide a more rigorous and evidence-based approach to enhancing workforce policies at CDC, as well as in state and local public health agencies. Ongoing and planned studies might prove to be promising by providing an evidence-base for recommendations and action items that could improve incentives to attract, retain, and reward a talented federal public health workforce, thereby promoting the culture of high-performance government.
